2011

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Cover Page Footnote

I am grateful to Prof. Eva Woods Peiró for sharing her workspace with me while I was doing research for this project during the year I was her colleague at Vassar College. Her supportive collegiality was, and continues to be, invaluable. I am also indebted to the members of Vassar College’s Medieval and Renaissance Faculty Seminar, whose feedback on an earlier version of this article greatly broadened my perspective of Sepúlveda.

Myth and Prophecy in Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s Crusading "Exhortación"
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The Spanish humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (ca. 1490-1573) is most commonly known for the doctrines he espoused in the Apología en favor del libro sobre las justas causas de la guerra (Rome, 1550).¹ Therein, he defended the use of violence for subjugating and Christianizing the inhabitants of the New World. But Sepúlveda’s oeuvre includes philosophical reflections on a range of themes, many of which await scholarly attention.² In this essay, I seek to complement

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existing studies of Sepúlveda’s stance on war by focusing on his “Exhortación a la guerra contra los Turcos” [Cohortatio ad Carolum V] (Bologna, 1529), a crusading exhortation that the Spanish humanist offered to Charles V on the eve of his coronation as Holy Roman Emperor. While Sepúlveda was renowned in his own time for his translations and glosses of Aristotle’s works, little has been said about the more prophetic characteristics of his thinking with regard to war. In what follows, I demonstrate the ways in which medieval apocalyptic rhetoric and humanist discourse intermingle in Sepúlveda’s crusade exhortation. I show that Sepúlveda relies on millenarian prophecies of the Last World emperor, narratives of the origin about the East and the West, and natural law theory to articulate justificatory foundations for the emerging new imperial world order. But first, I shall contextualize the “Exhortación,” beginning with a detailed explanation of the material conditions to which Sepúlveda’s text responds, along with a characterization of its place and function in the trajectory of his career.

The Political Landscape Surrounding the Writing of the “Exhortación”

In the opening pages of his “Exhortación,” Sepúlveda refers to the circumstances that urged him to write. On the one hand, there was the Ottoman Turks’ impending confrontation with Charles V’s imperial army and, on the other hand, there was the question of how the emperor would proceed in Italy. Ever since 1516-1517, when the Ottoman forces gained supremacy over the Muslim world by conquering regions in Asia Minor, the Balkans, Syria, and Egypt, their territorial advances brought them closer to Christian-held land. Evidence of their expansionist inclinations in Christian Europe under the leadership of Süleyman II (also known as Suleyman the Magnificent or simply “the Turk”) was further manifested by their military victory at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526. In the


4 The classic study on this subject is Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
period leading up to the writing of the “Exhortación,” the Ottoman forces had laid siege to Vienna (September-October 1529). Ironically, the Christian leader capable of coalescing Christian rulers’ efforts toward a more effective resistance against the Ottoman forces compounded the problem. Pope Clement VII (1523-1534) refused to convocate a general Church council that would have given Charles V greater power in Germany, as well as increased maneuverability in his fight against the Ottoman Turks.\(^5\)

With that complicated backdrop, the dramatic power struggle between Charles V and Francis I, King of France, unfolded on the world stage as they fought over territories in the Italian peninsula.\(^6\) For his part, Clement VII took advantage of their rivalry to advance the liberation of Italy from foreign occupation. Capitalizing on the conflict between the two monarchs, he made strategic alliances with each of them, turning against them when it suited him. For instance, following Charles V’s victory over Francis I at the Battle of Pavia in 1525, Clement VII formed an anti-imperial alliance known as the League of Cognac. The alliance, which was comprised of Francis I, the Republic of Venice, the Sforza, and England’s Henry VIII, purportedly came together to preserve Italy and the States of the allies, yet its real aims were to undo the policies that had come into place after Charles V’s victory at Pavia.\(^7\) Unfortunately for Clement VII, the League faltered when it failed to deliver on its promise of protection following Charles V’s refusal to comply with the League’s demands. Shortly thereafter, Clement VII struck a truce with Charles de Lannoy, the imperial envoy and Viceroy of Naples, that nonetheless failed to avert the imperial army’s attack on Rome in 1527 (May 6-12) and the Pope’s eight-month imprisonment at the Castel Sant’Angelo. While the signing of the Treaty of Barcelona on 29 June 1529, and Clement VII’s coronation of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor in Bologna the following year, represented a mutual gesture toward reconciliation, the tensions between them did not subside. In fact, the relations between them and their ambassadors continued to be marked by distrust.\(^8\)

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5 The council finally met when Pope Paul III convoked it on December 13, 1545.
8 For a view of the fragility of Spanish hegemony in Italy, see Michael Jacob Levin, Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
Navigating deftly through this political labyrinth, Sepúlveda produced a propagandistic treatise that echoed the messianic dreams that the imperial court held about Charles V’s empire, particularly the dream of the universitas cristiana. On a personal level, the treatise played a more specific role in Sepúlveda’s hopes for self-preservation and social mobility. Prior to joining the court of Charles V in 1536, when the emperor named him to the post of official royal chronicler, the Spanish humanist had developed roots in the Italian Peninsula during his studies at the Colegio Mayor de San Clemente de los Españoles de Bolonia (1515-1523). A Spanish outpost in the Papal States, the Colegio produced the letrados (law graduates) who served as royal functionaries in the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. As members of a distinguished community of scholars, the graduates of the Colegio were tied through relations of patronage that facilitated their social mobility and extended other means of support. During his studies there, Sepúlveda developed associations and friendships with men who figured prominently in Charles V’s conflicts and negotiations in Italy. Take, for instance, his friendship with Alberto Pio, Prince of Carpi (1475-1531), ambassador to Louis XII in the papal court and subsequently emissary of Francis I. Although some scholars disagree about the exact dates during which Sepúlveda joined Pio’s court, there is evidence indicating that he collaborated with him in the period between 1522 and 1525. After the French defeat at Pavia (1525), Pio adopted a pro-French policy that became more resolute following the destruction of his palace in Rome, the loss of the Carpi principality to the Este, and other appropriations of his possessions. Shortly after Pio’s death, Sepúlveda published the Antapologia pro Alberto Pio principi Carpensi in Erasmum Rotterdamum (Rome, 1532), proving his loyalty to his former patron by countering Erasmus’ attacks against the Prince of Carpi. Sepúlveda’s Antapologia became the final

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10 For a thorough discussion of Sepúlveda’s friendships and patrons see, Juan Gil, introduction to Epistolario by Sepúlveda in Obras Completas, eds. García Pinilla, Solana Pujalte, Juan Gil, vol. 8. (Pozoblanco: Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Pozoblanco, 2007).

11 For a summary of the Antapologia, see Bataillon, op. cit., 421-23. For a scholarly edition of the Antapologia in Spanish that explains Sepúlveda’s dispute with Erasmus see, Sepúlveda, “Antiapología en defensa de Alberto Pío, príncipe de Carpi, frente a Erasmo de Roterdam,” in
word in a controversy that began in 1525 when Alberto Pio claimed that the Dutch humanist’s writings contained the seeds that gave fruit to Luther’s heresies.

Among Sepúlveda’s patrons, Pope Clement VII and Cardinal Francisco de los Ángeles Quiñones (1475-1540) are especially significant for placing Sepúlveda and his “Exhortación” in proper context. Sepúlveda’s friendship with Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, who became Pope Clement VII in 1523, can be traced to June 1519, when Sepúlveda and a fellow peer embarked on a mission on behalf of the Colegio that involved obtaining a letter of recommendation from the Medici prince. In the preface to his translation of Aristotle’s Parvi Naturales (Bologna, 1522), Sepúlveda reminisces about how congenial were his interactions with the Giulio de’ Medici, boasting that he could often meet with the prince without submitting a request in advance. Sepúlveda fondly recalls that on one occasion the future pope even addressed him in Spanish. Four years after their first encounter, upon ascending to the papal throne, Clement VII entrusted Sepúlveda with the task of translating Aristotle’s complete oeuvre into Latin. In his post as the papal court’s official translator and glosser of Aristotle (1526-1534), Sepúlveda translated a number of Aristotle’s writings, as well as the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Alexandri Aphrodisiei enarrationem posteriorum librorum Aristote de prima philosophia, Rome, 1527), which he dedicated to Clement VII.

The productive partnership between Sepúlveda and Clement VII was disrupted in early May of 1527, when the Italianized Spanish humanist personally experienced the ravages of the Sack of Rome alongside his patron. Upon the invasion of the Spanish and German soldiers into the city, throngs of courtiers, women, and their children – about 3,000 people – sought refuge in the Castel Sant’Angelo. Despite his friendship with Clement VII, Sepúlveda had to fend

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12 B. Cuart Moner hypothesizes that Cardinal Quiñones is a key figure in Sepúlveda’s turn toward the imperial band. See his introduction to the “Exhortación,” by Sepúlveda, op. cit., cccvi-cccvii.

13 Sepúlveda, Epistolario, op. cit., 7.

14 Sepúlveda was renowned in his own time for his translations and glosses of Aristotle’s works. For an overview of how Italian humanists regarded his translations of Aristotle, see Alenjandro Coroleu, “The Fortuna of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s Translations of Aristotle and of Alexander of Aphrodisias,” Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 59 (1996): 325-32.

15 As Sepúlveda’s correspondence attests, their partnership continued as late as 1534, when Clement VII encouraged him to take on new projects. See Sepúlveda, Epistolario, op. cit., 72. For other manifestations of Clement VII’s support, including the conferral of priesthood upon him see, Ludovico Pastor, Historia de los Papas (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1911), 9: 252, note 11.

16 Ibid., 318-320.
for himself in the convulsing streets of Rome, as Cardinal Giambattista Orsini adamantly refused him entry into the castle on account of his Spanish nationality. Unable to count on the immediate protection of the Papal court, itself weakened as a consequence of the violence, Sepúlveda fled to Naples, where he witnessed the beginnings of the siege of Naples (May-September 1528) until the Papal emissary, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, called him to Gaeta to assist him in the exegesis of the Holy Scriptures.

Sepúlveda returned to Rome in 1529, when Clement VII commissioned the reform of the Roman Breviary to Cardinal Quiñones, requesting that Sepúlveda be included among the collaborators. Sepúlveda joined Quiñones, working with him on the Breviarium Sanctae Crucis (1535) and forming part of the Papal embassy that Clement VII organized to welcome Charles V to Italy. Sepúlveda was thus in the entourage that greeted Charles V upon his arrival to Piacenza (6 September-24 October 1529) in the months leading up the emperor’s coronation. On that occasion, Sepúlveda, acting on the advice of close friends, sought to impress Charles V by presenting him with a manuscript copy of his translation of Aristotle’s Metereolgiam.

In his next encounter with Charles V (early November 1529), Sepúlveda offered him the “Exhortación,” a treatise that provided further evidence of how his intellectual skills could be put to use in the service of the Christian empire. The fact that the Ottoman forces had recently besieged Vienna (27 September-14 October 1529) undoubtedly made Sepúlveda’s “Exhortación” a timely treatise. B. Cuart Moner asserts that the “Exhortación” was precisely “uno de los instrumentos utilizados por el futuro cronista para congraciarse con el emperador” [one of the instruments employed by the future chronicler to ingratiate himself with the emperor]. Indeed, Sepúlveda’s intervention into the question of the Muslim Turks was part of a common pattern among his fellow humanist colleagues from the quattrocento, whose intellectual productions were instrumental for gaining employment.

In her study of Renaissance humanist history writing, Margaret Meserve notes that while humanists wrote history to fulfill the classical ideal of the vita activa, they also wrote it in order to gain employment. Further, she points out that in their effort to make an impression, humanists intervened in “contemporary debates over political policy and the conduct of foreign affairs,” often posing the

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18 Sepúlveda, Epistolario, op. cit., 371.
20 Sepúlveda, Epistolario, op. cit., 52.
debates in historical terms that, in their view, “only they could recover” and for which “only they were able to provide historical answers.”\textsuperscript{23} Interventions into the question of Islam, she adds, were especially attractive for humanists wishing to advertise the indispensability of their knowledge and critical skills “to any ruler or state wanting to engage with the problem of Islamic expansion in an effective way.”\textsuperscript{24} Considering the function that humanist writings on the question of Islam could have in advancing or promoting the careers of humanists of the \textit{quattrocento}, it is reasonable to attribute that role to the “Exhortación” in Sepúlveda’s career trajectory.

\textit{Founding Myths: The Last World Emperor & Christian Peace}

In making his case for war, Sepúlveda gauges the stakes of what life under Muslim rule could mean for Christians, rebuts the claim that Christian principles forbid engaging in war, and affirms that Providence is on the Christian side. He concludes his discourse in a prophetic tone, envisioning that after the defeat of the Muslim Turks, Charles V would take the \textit{Reconquista} to other Christian territories beyond Iberia, including Greece, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, he avers that Charles V would return to Jerusalem, where he would worship God and request divine guidance for extending Christian rule worldwide.

On a most basic level, the “Exhortación” is an apocalyptic story about a struggle between the forces of good and evil. At the helm of the Christian kingdoms we find Charles V (a force for good, of course), whom Sepúlveda presents as the successor of valiant heroes from antiquity who defeated their enemies. Countering the forces of good, we find the “cruel domination” of the “barbarian” Turks (\textit{barbarorum crudeli dominatu}).\textsuperscript{26} The moral lesson within the story is that the good shall always prevail over evil. It is, furthermore, a story that draws religious and moral boundaries.

Like other humanists in the \textit{quattrocento} who dealt with the question of Islam, Sepúlveda combines medieval crusade rhetoric with humanist learning. For example, while he repeats formulaic clichés about the Turks (e.g., referring to them as infidels and barbarians), it is not uncommon for him to attempt substantiation of his perspective by using ancient philosophy and classical

\textsuperscript{23} MargaretMeserve, \textit{Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought} (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2008), 12.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Sepúlveda, “Exhortación,” op. cit., 344.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 333.
historiography. The intermingling of polemical approaches to the Turks with humanist learning is characteristic of a body of literature on the Turks and Islam that emerged among humanists in fifteenth-century Italy. Working within that tradition, Sepúlveda draws on Aristotle’s philosophy to construe the Ottoman Turks as cultural and religious adversaries, and derives lessons for the present from ancient Greek and Roman history. I shall speak to Sepúlveda’s employment of humanist learning in the following section, concentrating for now on a narrative that Charles V and his court must have found especially compelling. I am referring here to the apocalyptic subtext of the “Exhortación,” an element that underlies Sepúlveda’s millenarian hopes for Charles V.

While the genre of apocalyptic literature is diverse – its origins are traceable to the Hebrew prophets as well as to prophecies from ancient Persia – some general characteristics can be identified. Written in response to a crisis directly affecting the community, apocalyptic rhetoric is prophetic in tone and aims to explain the successes of rival religions and either inspire resistance or justify acceptance of the status quo. Although there is no evidence to support the claim that Sepúlveda’s millenarianism was derived from any particular millennial theory, many of the ideas that appear in his text can be traced to Byzantine Apocalypses and, more specifically, the Revelationes. Written by a seventh century Syrian author who assumed the name of St. Methodius (also Pseudo-Methodius), the Revelationes predicted the emergence of a Roman king, the Last World Emperor, who in addition to wreaking vengeance upon the sons of Ishmael (the Arabs) and putting an end to their persecution of Christians, would unify all of Christendom, bring about a reign of peace lasting a millennium, and then journey to the East, reigning in glory until the coming of the Antichrist. During this millennial reign, the conversion of pagans would flourish and the Last World Emperor would reign over Jerusalem, awaiting the advent of Gog and Magog, the Antichrist, and the Last Judgment.

A comparison of the “Exhortación,” with the Revelationes yields some important similarities and differences. As in the Syrian text, the “Exhortación” features the figure of a Last World Emperor, that is, a Roman king who unites Christendom, defeats Islam, brings about peace, facilitates the conversion of all non-believers, and reclaims Jerusalem. Ending in the epic triumph of Christendom over Islam, both texts announce the imminent world dominion of the Christian

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empire, yet unlike Pseudo-Methodius, Sepúlveda does not subscribe to the prophecy of the coming of Gog and Magog. This may be explained by the fact that although the _Revelationes_ drew on Biblical sources (specifically the prophecy of four kingdoms in Daniel 2 and Ezekiel 38-39), the prophecies contained in the Syrian text did not belong to a theological tradition. As for the coming of the Antichrist, the belief that either the Turk or Luther embodied that figure was a popular theory circulating in sixteenth-century Catholic Europe. But the need to identify either one explicitly with the Antichrist at a time of struggle against the Protestant Reformation and the Ottoman Sultanate was perhaps unnecessary among Christian polemicists.

What is worth underlining in this brief comparison is Sepúlveda’s investment in millenarian hopes envisioning the rise of the Last World Emperor whose arrival presaged peace among Christians and the universal dominium of Christendom. These investments shape his interpretive framework for understanding the present and envisioning the future. As a side note, it should be noted that Sepúlveda was not alone in casting Charles V in the role of Last World Emperor. The Viennese physician and historian Wolfgang Lazius, for instance, entertained a similar role for the Holy Roman Emperor in his millennial prophecies. However, the role of the Last World Emperor was not always exclusively reserved for Charles V, as evidenced by a competing tradition in France that cast Francis I in that role.

**Christian Peace: Pursuing Peace through War**

The belief that Charles V was the Last World Emperor carried with it the expectation that he would bring about the unification of Christendom and establish Christian peace. In practice, the principle of Christian peace meant peace among Christians in tandem with war against the enemies of the faith. According to the principle of Christian peace, Christians should live in peace with one another while promoting ongoing warfare with, in the language of the age, the infidel. In the early modern period the concept of peace did not signify the absence of war, but instead connoted the temperance of a Christian monarch’s aggression toward his cohorts, along with his engagement in ongoing warfare with the enemies of the faith. The Spanish historian Miguel Ángel Laredo

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29 Ibid., 343.
30 Protestants, on the other hand, held that the Pope was the Antichrist. For more, see Robin Barnes, “Images of Hope and Despair: Western Apocalypticism: ca. 1500-1800,” in _The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism_, ed. Bernard McGinn, vol. 2 (New York: Continuum, 1998), 159.
31 Ibid.
Quesada observes that while Christian monarchs expressed a desire to live in peace with other Christians, nonetheless declaring war on each other had not been unusual. Although a certain degree of conflict among Christians was considered acceptable, or at least unavoidable, the continual wars among the rulers of Spain, France, England and various kingdoms in the Italian peninsula were viewed with alarm by humanists because the wars that Christian monarchs fought against one another distracted them from the Ottoman Sultanate’s territorial advances into Christian Europe. In response to this internal crisis, Sepúlveda shunned any form of neutrality toward the issue of war against the Turks and repudiated the cautious postures of writers like Desiderius Erasmus, who objected to the untempered practice of war that had become common among Christian rulers, and who claimed that war was incompatible with Christian principles. I shall discuss Sepúlveda’s rebuttal of Erasmus in the last section, focusing for now on the productive uses that he ascribed to war.

Numerous passages in the “Exhortación” suggest that Sepúlveda believed that war against the Turks was a possible solution for dissolving the political dissensions among Christian monarchs and a path that could eventually lead to universal Christian rule. For example, in a passage in which he speculates on the advantages that would result if Christians could put an end to their internecine wars and join their resources against enemies of the faith, he avers that it would be possible to subject the Asian and African empires to Christian rule in a matter of a few years without shedding more blood than is typically lost among Christians in internecine wars.

Y si los nuestros, dejando de hacerse daño unos a otros y reuniendo sus fuerzas, hubiesen dirigido esos mismos ejércitos contra éste y otros enemigos de nuestra religión, habría resultado ciertamente fácil que, con la sangre de los cristianos derramada en heridas mutuas en estos pocos años en Italia y Lombardía, el dominio de África y Asia hubiese pasado a manos de los cristianos.32 [If our kind had ceased to harm one another and had gathered their forces and directed those same armies against this and other enemies of our faith, it would have certainly been easy, with the blood of the Christians that was shed in these last few years in Italy and Lombardy, for Africa and Asia to have passed over to Christian dominion.] (Italics mine.)

In addition to unifying Christians, he continues, war against a common, non-Christian enemy could expand the political power of Christian rulers to other parts of the world. It is important to note that Sepúlveda’s reference to

Christianity’s immediate enemies, the Ottoman Turks, is actually inclusive of other enemies of the faith, leaving open the possibility for future wars against non-Christians in Asia and Africa, but also in the New World. Sepúlveda’s idea of the role that the New World would play in bringing about Christian peace is sketched in the following excerpt. Hypothesizing about the advantages that would ensue after Charles V’s triumph over the Ottoman Sultan, Sepúlveda rhetorically asks him:

Y una vez dueño de estas provincias, ¿qué reino, qué nación podría oponer resistencia a tus fuerzas e impedir que puedas ampliar los límites de tu imperio sumando este orbe tripartito [Europa, Asia, y África] al que —según dicen— ocultan los antípodas, recientemente incorporado al dominio español y a la religión cristiana... con lo que habría a tu disposición recursos más que de sobra para alimentar cumplidamente tus tropas, aunque fuesen mucho más numerosas de lo que hemos dicho? [Once lord of these provinces, what kingdom, what nation could oppose your forces and keep you from expanding the limits of your empire by adding to this tripartite orb (Europe, Asia, and Africa) that other one which —they say— is occupied by antipodes and which has recently been incorporated under Spanish dominium and the Christian religion... with which there would be abundant resources at your disposal to adequately sustain your troops, even if they were to be more numerous than what we have said?] 33

On the one hand, the Crown’s acquisition of the New World would contribute to the territorial expansion of Christendom, and on the other, the wealth therein would sustain the imperial army’s territorial expansion in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

So the story of the epic triumph of Christendom over Islam in Sepúlveda’s “Exhortación” is generated out of two interrelated central prophetic myths: (1) the Last World Emperor and his millennial reign of glory, and (2) Christian peace. The role in which Sepúlveda casts Charles V identifies the Christian Empire as the last world empire before the arrival of the Kingdom of God. In terms of policy, the task that Sepúlveda advanced for the Last World Emperor was to bring about the reign of Christian peace by ending internecine wars among the Christian monarchs and unifying them in war against Muslims and other non-believers who refused to convert.

33 Ibid.
The role that Providence plays in Sepúlveda’s narrative is significant, as is indicated at the end of the “Exhortación,” when he asks Charles V: “Así pues, César, ¿por qué no despiertas y avanzas con paso firme por este camino que Dios y el destino te muestran hacia las más altas empresas y el dominio del orbe terrestre?” [Hence, Caesar, why don’t you wake up and advance with a firm step toward this path to which God and destiny direct you, toward the highest enterprises and the dominion of the world?] Dovetailing with millennial prophecies, the belief that God was on the side of the Christians gave to war a sacral sanction, and ensured military victory over the enemy. Yet, Providence and millennial prophecies alone are not the only elements that Sepúlveda employs to reignite crusade and justify war. He combines medieval crusade rhetoric with humanist learning, drawing on his knowledge of Greek and Roman history and the philosophy of Aristotle. It is to that I now turn.

History & the Narrative of Origins: More Myth-Making

In her study of Italian humanist discourses on the Turks, Nancy Bisaha observes that while “medieval perception and rhetoric regarding crusade and the Turks were still influential in Renaissance thought,” humanists’ approaches were nonetheless more secular because “use of the classical heritage allowed them to see holy war and the Muslim threat in entirely new ways.” Sepúlveda’s view of the confrontation between Christians and Ottoman Turks as mirroring clashes in antiquity between Greeks and Asians is a case in point. Although anachronistic (from a contemporary perspective), Sepúlveda’s comparison between the Turks and ancient Asian societies created an opening for an evaluation (however problematic it might be) of their government, laws, learning, and culture that was otherwise not possible within medieval crusade rhetoric. Bisaha adds that while more secular perspectives on the Turks did loosen the strictures of the medieval standpoints, humanist discourses on the Turks could either “prove as hostile as religious slurs,” or they could result in a “more open minded cultural and political evaluation.” In the case of the “Exhortación,” the projection of the ancient past onto the Ottoman Turks intensifies binary oppositions between Muslims and Christians by creating a myth about the origins and nature of “Europeans” and “Orientals.”

Sepúlveda considers classical history to be instructive for assessing the comparative military capabilities of the imperial army and the enemy’s armies.

34 Ibid., 345.
35 Bisaha, op. cit., 41-42.
36 Ibid., 50.
Bemoaning that those who oppose the war against the Turks had not taken the trouble of reading ancient Greek and Latin texts, Sepúlveda asserts that if only they had done so, they would have realized that average-sized Greek armies had often triumphed over a much larger number of Teutrican-Illyrian soldiers. As if to distance his discourse from the legendary aura surrounding the literary accounts of the Trojan War, Sepúlveda quickly moves on to more concrete, “reliable” historical documents to show that the small size of the Greek armies did not impede their triumph over enormous Persian armies. Among the examples he cites are the defeat of Xerxes I of Persia (ca. 519-465 BC) in the Greco-Persian wars and Alexander of Macedonia’s victory over Darius III, king of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, in the Battle at Issus (333 BC). With regard to Xerxes, Sepúlveda notes with delight that upon losing in naval combat against a small number of Greeks at the Strait of Salamis, the Persian king fled, abandoning his own brother-in-law, Mardonius (479 BC), and leaving him in charge of a 300,000 man army. Sepúlveda’s summary of the confrontation between the armies of Alexander and Darius III similarly focuses on how the small army of 36,000 men triumphed over the 600,000 Persian soldiers. Finally, Sepúlveda cites additional examples of battles between Europeans and Asians from the Roman period in which Persian leaders conceded victory to their opponents by fleeing, as was the case in Julius Caesar’s victory over Pharnaces II of Pontus (49 BC).

Sepúlveda’s allusion to the Trojan origins of the Turks is among the first signs of a narrative of origins. In fact, it is significant that Sepúlveda has some recognition of the mythic status of the Turk-Trojan linkage. Commenting on the notion of the Trojan origins of the Turks, Meserve observes that by the fifteenth century, humanists considered the Trojan thesis implausible because it “contradicted the most widespread contemporary assumption about the Ottoman foe: that of their extreme barbarity.” The Trojan thesis nonetheless circulated in poetic or imaginative works and was used for rhetorical ends (e.g., demonstrating ingenuity, erudition, etc.). It is thus no wonder that Sepúlveda shifts from a discussion of Homer’s mythologized account of the Trojan war to an analysis of historical facts that he is quick to characterize as reliable (“antiguos documentos de probada fiabilidad” [ancient documents of proven reliability]).

In his analysis of battles between Greeks/Romans and Persians, Sepúlveda wishes to underline two points. The first is that the size of an army is not the deciding factor for achieving victory, and the second point is that just as the Asian

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38 Ibid., 340.
39 Meserve, op. cit., 65.
soldiers and their kings fled from the Greeks/Romans, their descendants, many of whom comprise the Ottoman forces, will likely lack the valor to fight against the imperial army.\textsuperscript{41} Conversely, just as the valor and intelligence of the Greeks and the Romans accounts for their outmaneuvering of huge Asian armies, so can the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, count on the valor and intelligence of his men to outmaneuver the Ottoman Turks. Despite Sepúlveda’s ostensible shift from myth to history, his historical analysis yields a narrative about the origins and nature of the Ottoman Turks that is as fictitious as the Trojan-origin theory.

\textit{The “Barbarians,” a Greco-Roman Fiction}

Sepúlveda’s construal of the nature of the Ottoman Turks is derived from Greek philosophy. The ontological lens through which he perceives the Muslim Turks contributes to drawing moral boundaries between good and evil that, in turn, dovetails with the millennial prophecies discussed above. Sepúlveda’s regard for the Ottoman Turks is evident in his assessment of the challenge they posed to Christian soldiers. Referring to the Christian soldiers, he says that “se ven atacados por la bárbara fiereza de los turcos” [they find themselves under attack by the barbaric fierceness of the Turks].\textsuperscript{42} In the Latin version of this passage, Sepúlveda employs the phrase: \textit{barbara Turcarum immanitate infestantur} to refer to the kind of attack that the Ottoman forces launch. Setting aside the discussion of “barbaric” and its etymology for a moment, I want to note that Sepúlveda “otherizes” the Ottoman Turks by linking them to a dangerous and inhuman force that disturbs the natural order. For example, the word \textit{immanitas} characterizes something that is monstrous in character and that is inhuman, fierce, savage and wild.\textsuperscript{43} This interpretation is further suggested by the word \textit{infestus}, which signifies something dangerous, hostile, inimical, and troublesome. Together, \textit{immanitas} and \textit{infestus} cast the aggression of the Ottoman Turks as overwhelmingly dangerous and destructive. In another passage, where Sepúlveda urges Charles V to defend Christendom, Sepúlveda again employs similarly charged terms to achieve the same ends. Therein he pleads with Charles to:

\textit{…alejes de nuestros cuellos esta peligrosísima guerra y este enemigo infiel y defiendas la libertad y la religión cristiana de la cruel dominación e impiedad de los fieros bárbaros. […]remove from our necks this dangerous}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 339-340.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 330
\textsuperscript{43} All definitions of the Latin words in the following passages are derived from the \textit{Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary}, accessed October 27, 2010.
war and the infidel enemy, and defend our liberty and the Christian religion from the cruel domination and impiety of the fierce barbarians.]  

The Latin terms that Sepúlveda employs in this passage differ from those noted previously, yet they resoundingly echo their meaning. Impium hostem, the term for “infidel enemy,” refers to the enemy’s general wickedness and lack of respect or reverence for God. The word hostis refers to foreigners, but also enemies, further conveying the boundary that Sepúlveda sought to establish between the Muslim and the Christians.

An Aristotelian, Sepúlveda appraised the humanity of other societies through the scrutiny of their institutions and social practices. In so doing, he demarcated social boundaries that determined the degree to which a given society was fully human. Working with the assumption of a hierarchy of human societies that runs parallel to the relationship between matter and form in the physical world, Sepúlveda set out to demonstrate that the Ottoman people are inferior. For this reason, he focused on whether they were born to command by examining their political organization and institutions. While Sepúlveda does not directly refer to the Ottoman Turks as “barbarians,” he construes them as such in his comments about their form of government. For example, he concludes that Ottoman governors were unfit to rule themselves and others after citing what happens to the societies that become subject to Ottoman rule. He observes:

…se da el caso que los pueblos de influencia turca se ven reducidos a tan dura esclavitud, que no tienen leyes algunas ni instituciones que los gobierren, a excepción de unas pocas meticulosamente acomodadas a los caprichos de los tiranos. […]it turns out that the nations that become subject to Turkish influence find themselves reduced to such a harsh enslavement that they do not have any laws, nor institutions through which to govern themselves, with the exception of a few which meticulously accommodate to the whims of the tyrants.]

The government to which the Ottoman rulers reduce their vassals is tyrannical. In other words, Ottoman rule is not grounded in the association of free men who conform within civil society. Sepúlveda’s use of the word tyranny to refer to their government points to their presumed incapacity to rule over others, but also to the illegitimacy of their government. Under Sepúlveda’s critical gaze, even the few laws that the Ottoman Turks do possess fall short of his expectations. This is illustrated in his reaction to Turkish inheritance laws, which

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45 Ibid., 332.
proclaim that in the absence of a will and of progeny, the property of the deceased reverts to the royal treasury. Responding to this law, Sepúlveda remarks: “¡Nuevo tipo de tiranía, desconocida en épocas pasadas entre los pueblos civilizados!” [A new type of tyranny, unknown in former periods among the civilized nations!]. The divergence that Sepúlveda draws between the laws of the Ottoman Turks and those of “civilized nations” is clearly intended to suggest that the Turks are not competent to rule over others.

The specter of tyranny that Sepúlveda evokes in his discussion of Ottoman rule contributes to representing the Turks as inferior in other ways. For example, he points out that the absence of institutions of learning among the Turks has resulted in a lack of learned men. He states: “Así es que entre los turcos no hay ni filósofos, ni oradores, ni teólogos,” [So it is that among the Turks there are no philosophers, nor orators, nor theologians]. The Spanish humanist warns that the neglect that the Ottoman Turks show toward the study of the arts and sciences should be of concern for those interested in conserving and fostering knowledge. Appealing to humanists, he cites the case of Greece, which, he reports, after becoming subject to Ottoman rule:

se vio tan sumida en la ignorancia de todo tipo de textos que a duras penas puede encontrarse en toda ella una sola persona que tenga un conocimiento medianamente acceptable de la lengua que emplearon aquellos antiguos maestros de sabiduría y doctrina, cuyos escritos ahora admiramos. [found itself buried in ignorance of all types of texts, to the extent that it is difficult to find in the whole of Greece a single person with a moderately acceptable knowledge of the language that the ancient masters of wisdom and doctrine employed, and whose writings we now admire].

The association Sepúlveda forges between tyranny and ignorance in his evaluation of the Ottoman Turks contributes to his casting them as barbaric. This should come as no surprise, for as Bisaha explains, shortly after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the use of the term barbarian in reference to the Muslim Turks took root in the writings of many humanists. Scholars have shown that the term barbarian or barbaric was loaded with a whole set of cultural prejudices developed among the Greeks and the Romans in their conflictive interactions with Persian societies. An heir of the Greco-Roman tradition, Sepúlveda reproduces

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 331.
48 Ibid., 331-332.
49 Bisaha, op. cit., 60.
those prejudices and employs them to channel hatred against the Turks. In terms of the signification of the term that Sepúlveda exploited, that is, an incapacity for self-rule and intellectual inferiority, a look at Anthony Pagden’s study of the meaning of the term barbarian confirms that his approach fit into the Greco-Roman tradition. Pagden explains that while the notion of the barbarian did not originally imply the opposite of civil or politic in the Aristotelian sense, it did imply inferiority. Although in the seventh and sixth centuries BC the term barbarian was simply used to designate foreigners, including some people the Greeks respected, by the fourth century barbarian implied “cultural or mental inferiors.” Pagden adds that for Hellenistic Greeks the term barbarian meant babbler because in their view the inability to speak Greek indicated the absence of logos. The ancient Greeks regarded the possession of logos as a quality that distinguished men from animals, considering it fundamental for the creation of a political and moral society. He observes that by the sixteenth century, the term barbarian designated “all non-Christians of any race or belief who behaved in ‘savage’ and ‘uncivil ways.’”

The designation of Ottoman Turks as “barbarians” does more than call into question their capacity for self-rule and their intelligence. Sepúlveda exploited the term more fully by drawing on the meaning given to it in just-war theory. Frederick H. Russell provides an overview of the conceptual link between the barbarian idea and just war. He notes that the ancient Greek philosophers drew a distinction between internecine conflict and conflict with foreigners. While civil discord referred to internecine conflict among the Greeks, the notion of war was reserved for hostilities against non-Greeks, that is, barbarians. Much like the ancient Greek philosophers, who viewed outsiders with disdain and suspicion, early Roman legal theorists regarded “any foreign people with strange language and customs” as barbarians. Further, they applied the term barbarian to the enemies of Rome and to “countries not bound to [it] by any legal relationship.” When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, wars against non-Christians were considered to be “just wars” and they were favored over internecine conflict among Christians. Considering this intellectual baggage, it is

51 Ibid., 16.
52 Ibid., 24.
53 This conceptualization of war changed during the period of Alexander the Great. Under him, war could be directed against those belonging to the Greek community as well as barbarians.
55 Ibid., 26.
not surprising that in medieval theories of just war, the notion of just war was synonymous with waging war against barbarians. An heir to this tradition, Sepúlveda insists that the war against the Ottoman Turks is a just war because they are infidel enemies (*impium hostem*), that is, enemies of Christianity and the Church. This understanding of them facilitates his justification of war against them. In the remaining section, I shall explain how the justificatory theory of war that Sepúlveda develops for the Mediterranean context opens the way for his justification of military conquest of “barbarians” in the New World.

**A Theory for Empire: Sepúlveda’s Rebuttal of the Philosophia Cristi**

The struggle for liberty, according to Sepúlveda, is the principal reason for why the war against the Ottoman Turks is justifiable. Asserting that the war that Christians wage against the Ottoman forces is not fought to obtain glory, nor wealth, he asserts that: “hay que luchar por la patria, por los hijos, por los altares y los hogares, en suma, por la salvación y la libertad y por la mismísima religión” [the struggle should be for the homeland, the children, the altars and the home, and in sum, for salvation and liberty and for the (Christian) religion itself].

Commenting on Sepúlveda’s use of the trope of liberty in the “Exhortación,” Maravall observes that he establishes the superiority of Christian societies over “barbaric” ones by claiming that the former are comprised of free men who enjoy Christian and civil freedom. Sepúlveda does indeed emphasize that religious and civil liberty define Christian government, remarking that even if the ruler of a Christian republic is tyrannical, its laws, its magistrates, and the freedom of its men protect Christian and civil liberty. In addition to establishing the superiority of Christian-ruled societies, the trope of liberty promotes a cause for which it is worth killing others in war.

Sepúlveda assures Charles V that contrary to what others say, waging war is compatible with Christian principles. He is here indirectly referring to Erasmus’ *Philosophia Cristi*, much of which was inspired by the New Testament and in particular a passage advising Christians to love their enemies and refrain from violence. In addressing the position of Erasmus without directly naming him, Sepúlveda undermines his opponent’s credibility with an *ad hominem* slur, claiming that he sabotages the freedom of Christian people out of self-interest:

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57 Maravall, op. cit., 289
59 Mathew 5:39-41; 44-45 Standard Version
…corrompido por las promesas y regalos de los turcos [el autor] tiende perversas asechanzas a la libertad de los cristianos, que tienen impreso en su naturaleza … el convencimiento de que las guerras que entablan entre sí los hombres de fe son civiles e intestinas, y, en cambio, las que se entablan entre los turcos y demás infieles son enteramente conforme a derecho y piedad. […]corrupted by the promises and gifts of the Turks, (the author) lays out perverse traps on the liberty of the Christians, who have inscribed upon their nature … the conviction that wars waged amongst men of the same faith are civil and internecine, whereas those that are made against the Turks and other infidels are entirely in conformity to the law and piety.60

As is anticipated in the part of this passage referring to the conviction of Christian peoples, Sepúlveda’s case for the compatibility of the war with Christian principles rests on the pillars of reason (law) and faith (Christian doctrine).

In his rebuttal of Erasmus’ objections to war, Sepúlveda cites a biblical passage in which Christ declares that his kingdom is not of this world, deriving from it the observation that there are two kingdoms: the spiritual and the civil kingdom.61 Building on that distinction, he explains that each kingdom abides by different laws. Those who inhabit the spiritual kingdom, he says, seek perfection and thus adopt Christ’s teachings. Hence, when confronted with an injustice they should not take up arms, but rather, they should fight with prayer, tears, and tolerance.62 In contrast to them, those who act in the civil kingdom – monarchs and their vassals – should fulfill the duties assigned to them by both divine and human law, which demand that: “deben luchar enérgicamente contra las injusticias y la violencia de los enemigos” [they should fight vigorously against the injustices and violence of the enemies].63 Relegating the message of the Gospels to the spiritual realm, Sepúlveda looks to the laws that God purportedly revealed to man (in the Decalogue and via natural law) to make war compatible with Christian principles.64

Sepúlveda develops these ideas more fully in his subsequent work on war, the Demócrates sive de convenientia militae cum christiana religione (Rome,

61 Ibid., 336. The biblical passage in question is John 18:36 Standard Version
63 Ibid.
1535), as well as in his defense of the Spanish military enterprise in the New World, but as the present discussion demonstrates, the blueprints of his justificatory theories of war are traceable to the “Exhortación.” In fact, intimations of the views that Sepúlveda advances in the Demócrates segundo, where he defends the Spanish conquest, can be found in a passage of the “Exhortación” where he explains that vassals consent to the rule of a monarch in the belief that:

para que hubiese una persona que, en fiel defensa de la justicia, librara a los más débiles de las afrentas de los poderosos, y para que mantuviera equitativamente a las agrupaciones y asociaciones humanas, esto es, a las sociedades, en paz y en libertad, y no sólo defendiese al estado de sus atacantes, sino que lo agrandeza en riquezas y dignidad [there would be a person who, in loyal defense of justice, would free the weakest from the attacks of the powerful, and would impartially preserve social groups and human associations, that is, societies, in peace and liberty, and who not only would defend the state from its attackers, but also enlarge it with wealth and dignity.]  

(Italics mine.)

As this passage makes plain, in Sepúlveda’s view the duties of a monarch involve more than just protecting the weak from the powerful and securing liberty and peace. A ruler must also enrich the state with wealth and greatness. It is here appropriate to recall the rhetorical question that Sepúlveda posed to Charles V, asking him to imagine what would happen once he achieved victory over the Ottoman forces:

… qué reino, qué nación podría oponer resistencia a tus fuerzas e impedir que puedas ampliar los límites de tu imperio sumando este orbe tripartito [Europa, Asia, y África] al que —según dicen— ocupan los antípodas, recientemente incorporado al dominio español y a la religión cristiana. […what kingdom, what nation could oppose your forces and keep you from expanding the limits of your empire by adding to this tripartite orb (Europe, Asia, and Africa) that other one which —they say— is occupied

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65 The Demócrates sive de convenientia militae cum christiana religione was so well received that Cardinal Quiñones ordered his secretary, Antonio Barba, to translate and publish it. The title of that work is: Diálogo llamado Demócrates (Seville, 1541). For a modern edition see, Sepúlveda, “Demócrates primero,” in Tratados políticos de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, ed. A. Losada (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1963), 129-304.
by antipodes and which has recently been incorporated under Spanish dominium and the Christian religion.\textsuperscript{67}

Sepúlveda’s rebuttal of Erasmus’ objections to war accomplishes two interrelated objectives: (1) it establishes a parallel morality that accommodates (even naturalizes) the practice of war in government, and (2) it concedes that while the moral teachings of the Sermon of the Mount are appropriate for men who operate only within the spiritual realm, monarchs and their subjects are under the obligation of confronting the enemy with war when civil and Christian liberty are at stake.\textsuperscript{68} As the writings of Spanish baroque political theorists make abundantly clear, the consequence of the first of those objectives would result in the normalization of war in politics, constituting it as one among many of the ways through which to govern, even if that means waging war against Christians.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{Conclusion}

Sepúlveda’s offering of the “Exhortación” to Charles V in 1529 was part of the humanist’s attempt to ingratiate himself with his future patron. The treatise also came as a response to a significant socio-political reorientation in the European political arena following the Sack of Rome and the Treaty of Barcelona. In symbolic terms, Clement VII acknowledged Charles V’s hegemony in the European political arena when he partook in the coronation ceremony. The ritual endowed Charles V with the aura of arbiter of peace among Christian monarchs. An intellectual in the service of power, Sepúlveda exploited the instruments at his disposal to articulate a theory of war the aim of which was to bring about Christian peace. In so doing, he adopted crusade rhetoric, depicting the conflict between the Muslims Turks and Christians as a war between the forces of good and evil, East and West, barbarians and civilized men. Further, he grounded his narrative in literary tropes taken from apocalyptic literature. The ideas that Sepúlveda developed about war in the “Exhortación,” which culminated in his justification of the Spanish conquest, established for him the compatibility between war and Christian principles. And even more significantly, his ideas on the compatibility of war and religion contributed to normalizing the role of war in governance.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 344
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 336
\textsuperscript{69} On this point, see J. A. Fernández-Santamaría, op. cit.